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Recipients*
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding.'
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INTRODUCTION
By the end of the 2013 legislative session, nearly thirty states
proposed legislation that imposed or would have imposed some sort
of drug testing of individuals receiving government benefits.2 These
proposals would have established a wide variety of requirements and
procedures for implementing a system of drug testing. At their core, a
large number of the proposals planned to test a randomly selected
group of participants-or in some cases, all individuals receiving
benefits-for drugs, without any indication that these individuals used
or had contact with illegal drugs.3
These legislative proposals represent a sentiment among state
legislators that welfare recipients are fair game for suspicionless drug
testing. The legislators who proposed these laws identified drug use
among those receiving government benefits as a serious problem,
purportedly creating reliance on the welfare system, wasting
government money, increasing crime rates, and endangering children
within the state.' Based on these beliefs, state legislators concluded
2. See Drug Testing and Public Assistance, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.orglissues-research/human-services/drug-testing-and-public-
assistance.aspx (last updated Jan. 2, 2014). Those states include: Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. Id. In addition to these states, a
number of other states proposed similar legislation in 2012, including Arizona, California,
Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Id.
3. See OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: DRUG TESTING WELFARE RECIPIENTS:
RECENT PROPOSALS AND CONTINUING CONTROVERSIES 5-6 (2011), available at
http://aspe.hhs.govfhsp/llDrugTesting/ib.shtml (outlining and comparing all proposed
legislation involving suspicionless drug testing).
4. Similarly, the U.S. House of Representatives recently voted to allow states to
determine the best method for administering drug tests to all recipients of Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program benefits (formerly known as food stamps). See Lauren Fox,
House Amendment: Drug Tests for Food Stamps, U.S. NEWS (June 20, 2013),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/06/20/house-passes-amendment-to-give-drug-
tests-to-food-stamp-users. Representative Richard Hudson of North Carolina, sponsor of
the amendment to the Farm Bill that would have sanctioned testing for food stamps, said,
"This is a clear and obvious problem in our communities as nearly 30 states have
introduced legislation to drug test for welfare programs. We have a moral obligation to
equip the states with the tools they need to discourage the use of illegal drugs." Id. This
prompted one writer to argue that, as recipients of federal money, members of Congress
should also be subjected to suspicionless drug tests-especially after the arrest of
Representative Trey Radel for purchasing cocaine. See Petula Dvorak, Drug Testing Is a
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that stopping such drug use was a "special need" that excused the
state from complying with the Fourth Amendment's warrant and
individualized suspicion requirements and empowered the state to
test welfare recipients for drugs even when there is no individualized
suspicion of drug use.'
When states have enacted suspicionless drug testing of welfare
recipients, federal courts have eventually enjoined these programs
due to their lack of individualized suspicion, but the courts that have
invalidated the laws have not spoken with a definitive or unified
voice. Despite the federal injunctions imposed on similar laws, state
legislatures continue to take up the issue and cite cases where the
Supreme Court has approved suspicionless drug testing in other
contexts. Although some states have turned against the idea of
suspicionless drug testing due to the cost of the programs, other state
legislatures continue to insist that it is constitutional to drug test
welfare recipients without suspicion.' In response to these arguments,
lower courts have had trouble determining when the public interest in
combatting drug use outweighs the privacy interest of welfare
recipients. This balancing approach is at the heart of the special needs
exception, and the approach sends an ambiguous and uncertain
message on how the special needs doctrine will be applied in other
cases and in front of other courts.
To reduce this uncertainty and bring the special needs exception
more in line with its original purpose, this Comment argues that the
Supreme Court should enforce the Fourth Amendment presumption
requiring individualized suspicion and allow suspicionless drug testing
under the special needs exception only when relying on individualized
suspicion would be "impracticable." The Court should focus on
whether the government's objective can be accomplished without
individualized suspicion before it delves into the uncertain and heated
debate over whether there is a special need important enough to
outweigh an individual's interest in privacy.




5. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
6. See Steven Yaccino, A Faltering Approach to Denying Public Aid, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/26/us/state-drug-tests-for-public-aid-
recipients-have-limited-effect.html?_r=O.
7. See Drug Testing and Public Assistance, supra note 2 (recognizing that drug testing
of welfare recipients has been proposed steadily since federal welfare reform in 1996).
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Part I of this Comment begins by explaining the development of
the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment, its initial
focus on whether complying with Fourth Amendment requirements
would be impracticable before excusing those requirements, how the
special needs exception has grown "increasingly unsound, incoherent,
and over-expansive,"' and how the Court has sought to minimize the
special needs exception in its recent opinions. Part II then moves
from a descriptive to a normative analysis to show how-even with
the recent trend in limiting the special needs doctrine-the current
test's focus on balancing the public and private interests leads to
uncertain outcomes when it is applied to a new situation. This
inconsistency means that lower courts and legislatures will continue
to operate with uncertainty as they create and review systems that test
for drugs without suspicion. A recent experience in Florida showcases
the dangers of this inconsistency.
To combat this inconsistency, Part III suggests that courts should
place greater importance on the threshold question of impracticability
before balancing the public and private interests as a way to apply the
special needs doctrine with greater predictability. Looking at
impracticability first will create a more efficient and consistent
analysis for courts to apply as they consider drug testing of welfare
recipients and other new forms of suspicionless searches, a definitive
answer that welfare recipients should not be subject to suspicionless
searches, clearer guidelines for legislators as they determine when
they can abandon individualized suspicion, and a special needs
doctrine more in line with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.
I. THE SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION'
The Fourth Amendment usually requires "some quantum of
individualized suspicion" before the government can conduct a
constitutional search."o Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
recognized that "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
8. Marc M. Harrold, Computer Searches of Probationers-Diminished Privacies,
"Special Needs" & "'Whilst' Quiet Pedophiles"-Plugging the Fourth Amendment into the
"Virtual Home Visit," 75 MIss. L.J. 273, 339 (2005) (comparing the special needs doctrine
to other exceptions within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, such as the "pat-and-frisk"
doctrine set forth under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and the application of the
"secondary effects" doctrine).
9. Throughout this Comment, the phrases "special needs exception" and "special
needs doctrine" will be used interchangeably.
10. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976).
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requirement of such suspicion,"" and a number of "specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions" have sprung up that
excuse the government from complying with the individualized
suspicion requirement. 12 One of those exceptions is the special needs
doctrine. 13
When the government successfully invokes the special needs
doctrine, it can conduct suspicionless searches because the court finds
that the government's objective and the circumstances make it
impracticable to base searches on individualized suspicion.14 Using
the Supreme Court's precedents and the objectives that justified
those searches, advocates for suspicionless drug tests claim that this
exception to the Fourth Amendment justifies drug testing without
individualized suspicion of the person being tested." The following
subsections explore how the special needs exception developed, how
it expanded, and how the Court has recently sought to restrict this
exception to the Fourth Amendment.
A. Development and Expansion of the Special Needs Exception
First set out in Justice Blackmun's concurrence in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.," the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment
provides that under certain defined circumstances, the government
can search a person without individualized suspicion. First, the
government must not be acting in a law enforcement capacity."8
Second, relying on individualized suspicion must be impracticable.1 9
Third, the government interests in conducting the suspicionless search
must outweigh the individual's interest in privacy.20
Before T.L.O., the Court had ruled that it was appropriate to
conduct an administrative search in the absence of individualized
11. Id. at 561
12. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
13. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 619-21 (advancing the government's interest in preventing railway
accidents as justifying drug tests of railway employees).
16. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., the Court validated the search of a student's purse
after that student violated a rule against smoking. Id. at 343-48.
17. See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
18. See id. ("Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement






suspicion. 21 But in his T.L.O. concurrence, Justice Blackmun outlined
how the Court would analyze suspicionless searches moving
forward.22
To determine if the search was reasonable in T.L.O., the
majority employed a balancing test, questioning whether the
government's interests outweighed the individual's interest in
23privacy. Yet, Justice Blackmun laid out two additional factors that
must be present before the Court could justify the suspicionless
search through balancing. First, there must be a "special need,"
meaning that the government officials conducting the search must not
have a law-enforcement motive for conducting the search.24 Second,
the circumstances must make it impracticable to require a warrant or
individualized suspicion because these requirements would frustrate
the non-criminal government interest.25
Applying Justice Blackmun's special needs analysis, courts have
used the special needs exception to justify suspicionless searches in a
number of settings, ranging from drug tests of high school athletes
and railroad employees after a train accident, to government searches
of public employees' desks and welfare recipients' homes.26 In 1987, a
majority of the Supreme Court applied Justice Blackmun's special
needs doctrine in Griffin v. Wisconsin2 7 to justify searches of the
21. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976) (allowing for visual
searches of vehicles crossing the United States-Mexico border).
22. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (adopting for the first time the
language from Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in TL.O.); see also Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (continuing to use the language from Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in T.L.O.).
23. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-42 (balancing schoolchildren's privacy interests
against the school's interest in maintaining discipline, and ruling that the search in
question was reasonable).
24. See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and
Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1223, 1228 (2004).
25. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002)
(upholding suspicionless drug testing of students in extracurricular activities); Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (upholding suspicionless drug testing
of student-athletes); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678-79
(1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of customs officials); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-
34 (upholding drug testing railroad employees after major accidents); O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 719-26 (1987) (permitting searches of government employees' desks and
offices without probable cause); Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 931 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding that suspicionless searches of welfare recipients' homes before receiving
welfare benefits is permitted); see also United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 624 (4th
Cir. 2006) (upholding warrantless searches by probation officers of a probationer's person,
vehicle, and premises in the probationer's presence).
27. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
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homes of probationers.28 In this and other cases, the Court cited
Justice Blackmun's opinion in TL.O. and first determined whether it
would be impracticable to rely on individualized suspicion for these
searches.2 9
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court
expanded the special needs exception, placing greater significance on
the balancing test between the government's special need and the
individual's interest in privacy.3 0 The Court used the balancing test as
it considered whether special needs justified suspicionless drug tests
in two companion cases handed down on the same day, Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n3 1 and National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab.32 Both cases involved suspicionless drug testing
of government employees, and in both cases, the Court relied on the
special needs exception to justify the use of suspicionless drug tests.33
In Skinner, the Court approved a system of suspicionless drug
testing that would automatically take place after a train accident.34
The Court applied the special needs doctrine, drawing upon Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in T.L.O. and a recent opinion where the
majority of the Court adopted Justice Blackmun's approach." The
Court explained that the government had an interest in protecting the
safety of its workers and the safety of the public at large from train
wrecks." Having recognized that protecting employee and overall
28. Id. at 873-80.
29. See, e.g., id at 876 (finding that "the special needs of Wisconsin's probation
system make the warrant requirement impracticable" because it would frustrate the
purposes of the probation system and place a magistrate between the probation officer
and the probationer); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 722 ("In our view, requiring an employer to
obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employee's office, desk, or file
cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of
business and would be unduly burdensome.").
30. See, e.g., Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a Chasm in
Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 129-31 (1992) (noting the
flexibility with which courts can justify abandoning individual suspicion); Jennifer Y.
Buffaloe, Note, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to
Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 551-52 (1997)
(arguing that the rationale of the special needs exception means that this exception is
unbounded).
31. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
32. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
33. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 678-79; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34.
34. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606, 633-34.
35. See id. at 619 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring))).
36. See id. at 620 (comparing the monitoring of the railroad with the government's
supervision of "probationers or regulated industries, or its operation of a government
office, school, or prison").
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public safety was a special need, the Court framed the question as
"whether the Government's need to monitor compliance with these
restrictions justifies the privacy intrusions at issue absent a warrant or
individualized suspicion."37
The Court observed that it would be "impracticable in the
aftermath of a serious accident" to obtain evidence that would lead to
individualized suspicion of a particular employee using drugs.38 The
Court also recognized that the railroad workers had a diminished
expectation of privacy because they worked in a heavily regulated
field.39 In order to protect the public, the Court found that the
employer must rely on suspicionless drug tests, and as a result, it
upheld the practice.4 0
In Von Raab, the Court considered whether the federal
government could conduct suspicionless searches of U.S. Customs
officers.4 1 The Court reworded Justice Blackmun's formulation of the
special needs doctrine, explaining:
[O]ur cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's
privacy expectations against the Government's interests to
determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or
some level of individualized suspicion in the particular
context.42
This explanation moves impracticability out of its position as a
threshold question, and instead suggests that impracticability is the
conclusion one can come to if the public interest in the drug test
outweighs the individual's privacy interests. Later in the opinion, the
Court recited the special needs test without any mention of
impracticability at all, referencing only the non-law enforcement
requirement and the balancing test.43
Despite the fact that the Von Raab Court did not mention
impracticability as a requirement in the special needs analysis, it
proceeded to review the circumstances to assess whether
37. Id. at 621.
38. Id. at 631. The Court continued: "It would be unrealistic, and inimical to the
Government's goal of ensuring safety in rail transportation, to require a showing of
individualized suspicion in these circumstances." Id.
39. See id. at 627.
40. See id. at 633-34.
41. See Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1989).
42. See id. at 665-66 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20).
43. See id. at 678-79.
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individualized suspicion would be impracticable." The Court
established that it would not be possible for the Customs Service to
comply with the warrant requirements or to rely on individualized
suspicion every time it had to make a work-related search or drug
test, citing the need for swift execution of employment decisions.45
Additionally, after explaining other cases where individualized
suspicion had proven impractical, the Court found that the privacy
interests of the employees were outweighed by the need for physically
fit "front-line interdiction personnel" with "unimpeachable integrity
and judgment." 4 6
Six years later, the Court handed down its decision in Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton, 47 allowing for the suspicionless drug
testing of high school student-athletes.4 8 Finding that there was a
decreased expectation of privacy among the students, the search was
relatively unobtrusive, and the need for drug tests was severe, the
Court ruled that it was reasonable for the school district to conduct
suspicionless searches of all student-athletes. 49  To reach this
conclusion, the Court readily accepted two premises: (1) drug use was
a major and immediate problem,"o and (2) student-athletes had a
diminished expectation of privacy due to the supervisory role that the
school plays and the lack of privacy one must assume when becoming
involved in school sports."
Notably, Acton may have also limited the scope of the
impracticability required before invoking a special need. The Court
44. See id. at 666-67.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 670. Both decisions drew a harsh rebuke from the dissenting Justices. In
Skinner, Justice Marshall criticized the balancing test employed. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 639 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Tellingly, each time the
Court has found that 'special needs' counseled ignoring the literal requirements of the
Fourth Amendment for such full-scale searches in favor of a formless and unguided
'reasonableness' balancing inquiry, it has concluded that the search in question satisfied
that test."). In Von Raab, Justice Scalia broke ranks with his fellow majority members in
Skinner because the Customs Service presented no evidence of a real problem of illicit
drug use among its agents. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Over
the objections of these Justices, however, the Court moved from only allowing bodily
searches absent individualized suspicion in the context of dangerous probationers, see
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-75 (1987), to approving two separate instances
where the government could order its employees to be tested for drugs without suspicion,
see Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680.
47. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
48. See id. at 665.
49. See id. at 664-65.
50. See id. at 661-62.
51. See id. at 656-57.
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decided that the presence of less intrusive means of accomplishing the
government's objective did not render the chosen means
unreasonable. 5 2 The student-plaintiff claimed that the school could
have based the tests on individualized suspicion.53 But, the majority
refused to accept this argument, noting that the Court has
"repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search
practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."S4 The
Court in Skinner, too, reasoned that requiring the least restrictive
means would lead to countless second-guessing. After making this
statement, the Acton Court went on to hold that individualized
suspicion would be impracticable due to the adversarial relationship it
would create between teacher and student and the possibility that it
might unfairly target students who do not use drugs.56
Acton's conclusion that identifying a less intrusive means does
not indicate that the search is unreasonable has led some to argue
that Acton did away with the impracticability component of the
special needs test.5 ' This reading may be overstated, however, since
the Court did consider whether individualized suspicion would have
been impractical." Nonetheless, Acton seemed to set the stage for the
Court to legitimize more instances of suspicionless drug testing." As
long as the government's interest was important enough to overcome
the invasion of privacy created by the form of drug testing utilized
under the circumstances, the special needs exception appeared to
justify the drug tests.60
52. See id. at 663 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9
(1989)).
53. See id.
54. See id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989)).
55. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989).
56. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 663.
57. See Christian Edward Samay, Comment, Judicial Activism Works the Constitution
Out of Shape-Acton and Its Atrophic Effect on the Fourth Amendment Rights of Student
Athletes, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 291, 305-06 (1997) ("Without any logical or legal
support, Justice Scalia made short shrift of the well established requirement that the
impracticability of a suspicion based governmental policy must be demonstrated before an
alternative, suspicionless search policy may be considered."); see also Acton, 515 U.S. at
678 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the majority "never seriously engage[d]
the practicality" of a suspicion-based program, and as a result approved a program that
was overly broad and intrusive).
58. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 663.
59. See JOHN L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 259-60 (2008).
60. See id.
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B. Recent Efforts to Limit the Scope of the Special Needs Exception
A number of scholars have criticized the direction taken by the
Court in the special needs cases explained above. Some have
expressed disapproval of the inconsistency with which judges
determine when special needs exist.61 Others have contended that the
balancing test used in special needs cases overemphasizes the public
concern to the point where the individual's interest in privacy can
never outweigh the government's interests.62 Whether in response to
this criticism or not, the 1998 decision in Chandler v. Miller"
appeared to signal a shift towards limiting the Court's special needs
jurisprudence." Including Chandler, three of the four most recent
special needs cases taken up by the Court have imposed some sort of
limitation on the doctrine. 5
61. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 584-85 (1995) ("The
factors in the balancing test have become mere shells, manipulated to justify unguided
conclusions as to what the majority in any given case concludes is reasonable.").
62. See Nuger, supra note 30, at 100 ("When the Supreme Court defines the
governmental function as so exceptionally important that special needs ... justify
inspection schemes normally vulnerable to the Fourth Amendment, it reduces the
resulting balancing test to one in name only.").
63. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
64. As with all trends in the Court's history, changes in membership could play a key
role. Two justices will be important if the Court is to continue in this trajectory. First,
Justice Samuel Alito is important because he replaced Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on
the bench. Justice O'Connor was skeptical of the special needs doctrine and advocated for
a narrower exception to the Fourth Amendment. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 678 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Assuming Justice Alito would join his
fellow conservative colleagues in allowing a broader special needs doctrine, the change in
the make-up of the Court makes the second justice-Justice Stephen Breyer-all the more
important. Justice Breyer has voted with the majority in all four of the most recent special
needs cases, voting to strike down the suspicionless searches in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, City of Indianapolis v. Edrnond, and Chandler, but upholding the suspicionless
search in Earls. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston 532 U.S. 67, 69 (2001); City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 33 (2000); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 307; Bd. of Educ. of
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 824 (2002). Although the retirement of
Justice O'Connor may darken the possibilities of limiting the special needs doctrine, it
does not foreclose the possibility of further reform. Chandler was an 8-1 decision striking
down the Georgia suspicionless drug testing program. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 307. Thus, a
majority could vote to limit the special needs doctrine, so long as Justice Breyer and one
of the more conservative justices that voted with the majority in Chandler (Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas) are on board. See id. at 307-09.
65. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 (refusing to find a special need where the primary
purpose of the drug test involved law enforcement objectives); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48
(refusing to find a special need where the primary purpose of the highway checkpoints
involved law enforcement objectives); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-22 (requiring that the
government prove the existence of an actual threat to safety and not merely a symbolic
threat).
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In Chandler, the Court considered a Georgia law that required
all candidates for state office to pass a drug test.' The Court
explained that the category of constitutionally permissible
suspicionless searches was "closely guarded."67 The Georgia law did
not fit into the special needs exception because the government
objective behind the law addressed a hypothetical problem.' As such,
the government objective was not substantial enough to outweigh the
office seekers' interest in privacy.69 For the first time since it set out
the exception in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,70 the Court found a set of
suspicionless drug tests unconstitutional under the special needs
doctrine."
The Court held that the Georgia program of suspicionless drug
tests was unconstitutional after it found that no special need existed
to justify the drug tests.7 2 Chandler is different from the preceding
special needs cases because the Court gave substantial consideration
to the threshold question of whether a special need existed.73 In
previous cases, by contrast, the Court gave only a brief look at the
question before spending the majority of its time focusing on the
balancing of public and private interests.74 Chandler marked the
possibility of a major change in the special needs analysis, but it was
unclear whether this would have any lasting effect on how the Court
analyzed suspicionless drug testing cases."
Exploring other areas of the special needs analysis, the Court's
decisions in Ferguson v. City of Charleston76 and City of Indianapolis
66. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 319.
69. See id. at 318.
70. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text (describing T.L.O. and the origin of
the exception).
71. The Eleventh Circuit used the same argument to find that the district court had
not abused its discretion when it issued a preliminary injunction against the Florida system
of suspicionless drug tests. See Lebron v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 710
F.3d 1202, 1214 (11th Cir. 2013) ("Because we agree with the district court that the State
failed to meet its burden in establishing a special need for its mandatory, suspicionless
drug testing of [Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF")] applicants, that
ends our inquiry into the testing regime's validity for Fourth Amendment purposes, and
thus, we need not weigh any competing individual and governmental interests."). For the
procedural history of the Lebron litigation, see infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
72. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 317-22.
73. See id. at 318.
74. See Zachary A. Bulthuis, Note, Suspicionless Drug Testing by Public Actors: How
Chandler v. Miller Should Change the Standard, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 1549, 1563 (2001).
75. See id.
76. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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v. Edmond" also invalidated sets of suspicionless searches by strictly
enforcing the threshold distinction between law enforcement and
non-law enforcement purposes." Ferguson involved drug tests that
were administered to a group of expectant mothers by the Medical
University of South Carolina hospital.7 9 The hospital staff tested those
expectant mothers who met certain criteria suggesting drug abuse."
The hospital shared any subsequent positive test results with local law
enforcement in order to ensure that the mothers remained drug-free
during their pregnancies."
The Court clarified that the special needs doctrine was meant to
operate outside of the law enforcement context. By sharing the
results of the drug tests with law enforcement and advocating for the
State to prosecute expectant mothers who tested positive, the hospital
was participating in the law enforcement process." As a result, the
hospital could not claim that the special needs doctrine justified
suspicionless drug tests of the expectant mothers." To some, the
decision in Ferguson confirmed their hopes that the Court was setting
77. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). For purposes of this Comment, the Edmond decision appears
to have been sufficiently in line with Ferguson in advancing the "primary purpose" rule,
see Harrold, supra note 8, at 317-18, that its facts will not be revisited in this Comment.
For more in-depth analysis of how Edmond set forth a "primary purpose" test, see 4
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 9.7(b) (5th ed. 2012).
78. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85-86 (finding drug tests of expectant mothers for
cocaine unconstitutional because the doctors were working in conjunction with local law
enforcement); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32 (excluding evidence obtained at a drug checkpoint
because the police at the drug checkpoint had a law enforcement purpose); see also
Christopher Mebane, Note, Rediscovering the Foundation of the Special Needs Exception
to the Fourth Amendment in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 177, 195
(2003) (recognizing that Ferguson sought to limit the special needs exception to instances
where there is a clear non-law enforcement purpose).
79. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71-72.
80. Id. at 71 n.4. The hospital first implemented a protocol where mothers who tested
positive for cocaine were referred to a local treatment center, but the incidence of cocaine
use among the hospital's patients did not appear to change. Id. at 70.
81. See id. at 72.
82. See id. at 84.
83. See id. The hospital's policies prescribed the offenses that an expectant mother
who tested positive for drugs would receive, based on the stage of her pregnancy:
If the pregnancy was 27 weeks or less, the patient was to be charged with simple
possession. If it was 28 weeks or more, she was to be charged with possession and
distribution to a person under the age of 18-in this case, the fetus. If she
delivered 'while testing positive for illegal drugs,' she was also to be charged with
unlawful neglect of a child.
Id. at 72-73.
84. See id. at 84.
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out to transform and constrain the scope of the special needs
doctrine. 5
Conspicuous in this trend toward a more restricted special needs
doctrine is the case of Board of Education of Independent School
District No. 92 v. Earls."6 Once again, the Court took up the issue of
suspicionless drug testing in schools." However, in this case, the
Court considered whether it should expand upon its holding in Acton
and find that a school could test all participants in extracurricular
activities, not just student-athletes." The Court held that the school's
suspicionless testing in Earls was constitutional.89 But instead of
focusing on the suspected drug use among extracurricular participants
in the particular school district, the Court looked to national statistics
on drug use among all high school students." Some scholars pointed
out that this focus on national statistics and the recognition that drugs
are a danger to all students could lead the Court to justify random
drug testing of all students.9 1 Earls certainly does not fit with the
preceding decisions that sought to limit the special needs exception,
but it does fit with the previous school cases that treated the in loco
parentis' relationship as justifying a severely diminished expectation
85. See Joseph S. Dowdy, Recent Development, Well Isn't That Special? The Supreme
Court's Immediate Purpose of Restricting the Doctrine of Special Needs in Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1050, 1068 (2002) ("Hence, Ferguson should not be taken
lightly by those who study or practice Fourth Amendment law. While the Court did not
expressly announce that it was weakening the doctrine of special needs, it did so in a very
meaningful way by creating the immediate purpose inquiry. Moreover, the subtle changes
in tone and the votes in Ferguson confirm an ongoing erosion in the support for the
doctrine among the members of the Court. Policymakers who devise search policies
predicated on the doctrine of special needs would be wise to scrutinize the immediate
purpose of their policies and eliminate any clear links to law enforcement because the
Court is searching for ways to quietly eliminate the doctrine of special needs.").
86. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
87. See id. at 825.
88. See id.; see also supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
holding in Acton).
89. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 825.
90. See id. at 834 ("The drug abuse problem among our Nation's youth has hardly
abated since [Acton] was decided in 1995. In fact, evidence suggests that it has only grown
worse."); id. at 838 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The school's drug testing program addresses
a serious national problem by focusing upon demand, avoiding the use of criminal or
disciplinary sanctions, and relying upon professional counseling and treatment.").
91. See MILLS, supra note 59, at 259-60. But see Teannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch.
Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 930 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (invalidating a school district plan that
would subject all students to random drug testing after finding that the entire student body
has an "increased expectation of privacy over that of student athletes" and recognizing the
"near dearth of evidence demonstrating a need to be met by the search").
92. Meaning "in place of the parent," the in loco parentis doctrine is a common law
principle that has been codified in many states and provides that an individual who is not a
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of privacy among students.3 As a result, the Court found a reason to
apply a broad special needs exception in the school context. Yet, due
to the school-specific nature of its rationale, Earls should not be read
to mean that the Court is abandoning its push for a more constrained
special needs exception.
The opinion in Earls notwithstanding, three of the four most
recent special needs cases indicate a possible trend towards limiting
the special needs exception. The decision in Earls continues to show
that the Court can be persuaded that a special need exists, especially
when there is an ongoing special relationship between the
government and the population that is tested. Nonetheless, in
Ferguson and Chandler, the Court clarified that two types of drug
tests-those that directly involve law enforcement and those that do
not serve a concrete need-cannot be justified through the special
needs doctrine.94 These opinions could suggest that the Court is ready
to move even further in clarifying and limiting the special needs
doctrine.9 s
C. Current Framework of the Court's Special Needs Test
The framework that the Supreme Court currently uses in special
needs cases is relatively clear. Courts must look for an actual
government interest that is important enough to constitute a special
need.9' Usually, this special need involves public safety,97 but it must
parent can assume all of the obligations that are incident to the parental relationship. See
28 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 545 (1981). Additionally, those standing in loco parentis
can also exercise all rights incident to the parental relationship. Id. Under and apart from
statute, teachers and other educational employees may stand in loco parentis. See 78 C.J.S.
Schools and School Districts § 503 (2008).
93. See Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing,
and the Inferior Fourth Amendment, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 751, 769-70 (2011)
(arguing that safety and the in loco parentis role are the two justifications under which the
Court has imposed the special needs doctrine); Walker Newell, Tax Dollars Earmarked
for Drugs? The Policy and Constitutionality of Drug Testing Welfare Recipients, 43
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215, 226-27 (2011) (recognizing that Earls did not add much
to the doctrine already established by Acton).
94. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82-84 (2001); Chandler v. Miller,
520 U.S. 305, 318-19 (1997).
95. See Harrold, supra note 8, at 317-18 (arguing that Chandler "slowed the 'special
needs' train" and "the Court, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond and Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, seemed to want to return the 'special needs' doctrine to its roots").
96. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323 ("[W]here, as in this case, public safety is not
genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no
matter how conveniently arranged.").
97. See Newell, supra note 93, at 226-27 (arguing that Chandler requires public safety
concerns to constitute a public safety need). But see Marchwinski v. Howard (Marchwinski
II), 309 F.3d 330, 335 (6th Cir. 2002) (identifying public safety concerns as one of several
962 [Vol. 92
2014] REEMPHASIZING IMPRACTICABILITY 963
not be related to law enforcement.98 Having found a special need, the
court must then balance the government objective with the
individual's interest in privacy.9 9 When balancing, the court considers
the government's need,'" the intrusiveness of the search,10 and the
individual's expectation of privacy.102 If the court considers the
impracticability of individualized suspicion, it is usually mixed in as
part of the balancing calculus.' A special relationship between the
government and the person being tested could indicate that there is a
diminished expectation of privacy, which would factor into the
balancing.'" For instance, courts have found a diminished expectation
of privacy among public school students,0 5 individuals on
probation,10 government workers,107 and workers employed in a
highly regulated field.'0o
Although balancing has been the focal point in the special needs
analysis, the recent attempts to recalibrate the special needs
special needs that the government had), reh'g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 319 F.3d
258 (6th Cir.), rev'd by an equally divided court, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003). For
further explanation of the procedural history of the Marchwinski litigation, see infra note
133. -
98. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84.
99. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989);
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 616-18 (1989).
100. See, e.g., Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
101. Drug tests are relatively intrusive. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 ("There are few
activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine. Most people
describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally
performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally
prohibited by law as well as social custom."). However, the public interest can outweigh
the individual's interest in privacy so long as there is no observation of the drug testing
and the information from the test is not released. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995).
102. See, e.g., Acton, 515 U.S. at 658 n.2 (finding student-athletes had a diminished
expectation of privacy); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 ("We think Customs employees who
are directly involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry
firearms in the line of duty likewise have a diminished expectation of privacy in respect to
the intrusions occasioned by a urine test." (emphasis added)).
103. See, e.g., Acton, 515 U.S. at 660.
104. See Newell, supra note 93, at 226-27 (arguing that Chandler requires public safety
concerns to constitute a public safety need).
105. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002);
Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
106. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987).
107. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679 (upholding drug tests of custom officials);
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (ruling that a search of a doctor's office
at a state hospital was reasonable, citing the efficiency interests of the governmental
employer as sufficient to dispense with the warrant and probable cause requirements).
108. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (approving drug
testing of railroad employees).
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exception recognize that change is necessary for lower courts to apply
the balancing test in a consistent manner.10 9 The outline of the Court's
analysis may be clear, but the implementation of that balancing test
continues to be a problem, as the following Section demonstrates.
II. INCONSISTENT DECISIONS ON SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING OF
WELFARE RECIPIENTS
Although the Supreme Court has issued several opinions that
appear to limit the special needs analysis, the inconsistency within this
area of the law continues to cause problems as government actors try
to determine when individualized suspicion is required and when it is
excused. The suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients is one
area where the balancing test used within the Court's special needs
precedents has not led to clear outcomes on the constitutionality of
the government's testing schemes. This inconsistency means that
lower courts and legislatures will continue to operate with uncertainty
as they create and review systems that provide for suspicionless drug
tests. This Part begins by detailing laws enacted in Florida, Georgia,
and North Carolina that implemented drug testing of welfare
recipients, and then considers the inconsistent judicial responses to
such programs. Finally, this Part attempts to pinpoint the main areas
of disagreement between proponents and opponents of suspicionless
drug testing.
A. Recent Laws Implementing Suspicionless Drug Testing of Welfare
Recipients
In recent years, Florida and Georgia enacted legislation that
would require that all applicants for welfare benefits initially pay for
and pass a drug test before receiving benefits."o These laws state that
the tests are to be minimally invasive and that the applicant must be
given adequate notice that testing is a requirement for receiving
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF") benefits."'
Nonetheless, both laws condition receipt of TANF benefits on the
109. See Bulthuis, supra note 74, at 1570; Harrold, supra note 8, at 317-18.
110. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.0652(2) (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193(e)
(2013). After enacting a regime of suspicionless drug testing similar to the one
implemented by Florida, Georgia decided to delay the implementation of its program as it
awaits the outcome of the legal challenges to the Florida system. See Rachel La Corte, Bill
Would Add Potential Drug Test for Welfare, SEATrLE TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://seattletimes.com/htmlIlocalnews/
2020352594-apwawelfaredrugtesting2ndldwritethru.html.
111. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.0652(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193(e).
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results of the drug test and require the individual to bear the cost of
testing.112 Thus, all applicants must comply with the requirement
regardless of whether there is reason to suspect a participant of drug
use or not."'
In 2013, the North Carolina General Assembly passed its own
scheme for drug testing welfare recipients.'14 The bill was different
from the Florida and Georgia legislation, requiring "a drug test to
screen each applicant for or recipient of Work First Program
assistance whom the Department [of Health and Human Services]
reasonably suspects is engaged in the illegal use of controlled
substances.""s For the purposes of the bill, reasonable suspicion
could stem from a conviction or arrest related to illegal drugs or a
determination by a qualified medical professional that the applicant is
addicted to illegal drugs."'6 However, all applicants are subject to
''screening tools" used by the Department of Health and Human
Services." 7 There is no guidance in the legislation about the nature of
these screening tools or how they will operate."'
Despite the mention of reasonable suspicion, Governor Pat
McCrory subsequently vetoed the legislation."9 Governor McCrory
112. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.0652(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193(e); OFFICE OF
ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 5-6.
113. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.0652(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193(e).
114. H.B. 392, 2013-2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/House/PDF/H392v6.pdf.
115. Id. § 4.
116. Before this most recent enactment, North Carolina would only subject
participants in its Work First Program to random and suspicionless drug testing if a
qualified medical professional first determined that the person was addicted to drugs or
alcohol. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-29.1(a) (2011), amended by 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws
417. The only individuals allowed to make such a determination were doctors or those
with a specific certification from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human
Services. Id.
117. See N.C. H.B. 392.
118. See id.
119. See House Bill 392 Information/History (2013-2014 Session), N.C. GEN. ASSEMB.,
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BiIIID=hb+392
&submitButton=Go (last visited Feb. 16, 2014); see also Memorandum from Governor Pat
McCrory to N.C. Gen. Assembly, Governor's Objections and Veto Message (Aug. 15,
2013) [hereinafter McCrory Veto Message], available at
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/h392Veto/letter.pdf (expressing Governor McCrory's
desire to prevent drug use among welfare recipients but disagreeing with the North
Carolina General Assembly on the appropriate means of preventing such drug use);
Arthur Delaney, Pat McCrory Vetoes Welfare Drug Test Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug.
16, 2013, 12:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/15/pat-mccrory-pat-mccrory-
welfare-drug-test-n-3677667.html (reporting on Governor McCrory's veto and his
executive order to enforce the bill's requirement that the North Carolina Department of
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explained his veto, in part, by expressing skepticism that "reasonable
suspicion" under the bill does not match the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.120  Additionally, McCrory emphasized the
difficulty of ensuring consistent application of the law in each of the
state's 100 counties. 12 1 Over Governor McCrory's objections, the
North Carolina General Assembly overrode the veto. 22 The system
of drug tests is set to begin on August 1, 2014.123
These legislative actions reflect a larger groundswell of bills that
call for suspicionless searches in other states. Writing in 2011,
Professor Jordan C. Budd collected empirical data on the scope of
this legislative trend toward suspicionless drug testing of welfare
recipients.12 4 His research reported that twenty-seven legislatures had
proposed a total of forty-nine bills that would have conditioned
government benefits on a suspicionless drug test, with ten
legislatures-those of Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee-producing multiple bills that required suspicionless
testing.'25 Out of the forty-nine bills allowing suspicionless drug
testing, only thirteen bills proposed during this period would have
screened for individualized suspicion of drug use before forcing
applicants to submit to a drug test. 26
This trend has its roots in the congressional authorization of such
testing schemes during the 1996 welfare reform debate. 27 Congress
declared, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, States shall
not be prohibited by the Federal Government from testing welfare
recipients for use of controlled substances nor from sanctioning
welfare recipients who test positive for use of controlled
Health and Human Services check welfare and food stamp applicants' criminal histories
and explore the possibility of sharing that information with law enforcement).
120. McCrory Veto Message, supra note 119; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(protecting the people "against unreasonable searches" and requiring warrants to be
supported by probable cause).
121. See McCrory Veto Message, supra note 119.
122. See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 417 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108A-26.1, 108A-
26.2, 108A-29.1, 114-19.34 (2013)); House Bill 392 Information/History (2013-2014
Session), N.C. GEN. ASSEMB., http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl
?Session=2013&BiIIID=hb+392&submitButton=Go (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
123. 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 417, § 8.
124. See Budd, supra note 93, at 784-85.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. For broader coverage of the 1996 welfare reform debate and its effects, see Isabel
V. Sawhill, R. Kent Weaver & Ron Haskins, Welfare Reform Reauthorization: An




substances."'" Although Congress believed states could test welfare
recipients, it is not clear whether states can constitutionally test
without suspicion. Some courts have struggled when asked to rule on
this issue, 129 and as this Comment argues below, legislators will
continue introducing these bills as long as the special needs exception
focuses on weighing the importance of the government interest
against the individual interest in privacy rather than testing as a
threshold matter whether individualized suspicion is impracticable. 13 0
B. Inconsistent Responses by Courts to Suspicionless Drug Tests
The inconsistency with which lower courts have applied the
special needs analysis was on display in one of only two decisions
from a federal appeals court on the constitutionality of suspicionless
drug tests of welfare recipients. In Marchwinski v. Howard, the
Eastern District of Michigan ("Marchwinski I")"1 and a panel of the
Sixth Circuit ("Marchwinski II")132 disagreed on whether a Michigan
law that would test all welfare recipients for illegal drugs was
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit,
sitting en banc, issued an evenly-divided,' four-sentence opinion that
reversed the Sixth Circuit panel and reinstated the district court's
injunction.'3 4 Instead of slamming the door on suspicionless drug tests
of welfare recipients, the conflicting opinions in Marchwinski seemed
to imply that the issue was a close one and that a constitutional
regime of suspicionless drug tests was possible.'
128. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-193, Title IX, § 902 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 862b (2012)).
129. See infra Part II.B (discussing the convoluted path of Marchwinski v. Howard,
where the Sixth Circuit reversed an injunction placed on a system of suspicionless drug
testing in Michigan only to have that decision vacated by an evenly-divided Sixth Circuit
sitting en banc).
130. See infra Part III.
131. Marchwinski v. Howard (Marchwinski 1), 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(finding that the suspicionless drug tests violated the Fourth Amendment), rev'd,
Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted, judgment vacated,
Marchwinski III, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir.) (en banc), affd by an equally divided court,
Marchwinski IV, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
132. Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted, judgment
vacated, Marchwinski 111, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir.) (en banc), rev'd by an equally divided
court, Marchwinski IV, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
133. Under Sixth Circuit rules, granting an en banc petition vacates the previous
decision by the Sixth Circuit. See 6th Cir. R. 35(b). Since the en banc decision was then
evenly divided, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court.
134. See Marchwinski IV, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003).
135. See Newell, supra note 93, at 233 (arguing that Marchwinski should have been but
was not a "death knell" in the efforts to submit welfare recipients to suspicionless drug
tests).
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The Eleventh Circuit is the only other federal appeals court to
consider whether suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients is
constitutional. In Lebron v. Secretary, Florida Department of Children
and Families ("Lebron II"'),'16 the Eleventh Circuit found that the
district court in Lebron v. Wilkins ("Lebron I")1'3 did not abuse its
discretion by enjoining Florida's suspicionless testing of welfare
recipients.13 8 It is possible that the Eleventh Circuit's recent opinion
may have cleared up the issue.'3 9 However, the case's procedural
posture means that the Eleventh Circuit has not ruled on its ultimate
merits.40 instead, the court only considered whether the trial court
"abused its discretion in concluding that Lebron is substantially likely
to succeed in establishing that Florida's drug testing regime for TANF
applicants violates his Fourth Amendment rights." 4 ' Although the
holding suggests that the Eleventh Circuit would likely find that the
drug testing at the heart of the Florida program is unconstitutional,
this attenuated analysis does not deliver the definitive answer on this
issue that lower courts need.
After the federal courts enjoined the program of suspicionless
drug testing in Florida, there was a tremendous outcry from
advocates of the program.142 The fervor seen in Florida after the
injunction demonstrates that there are widely divergent opinions on
136. 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013).
137. 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd, Lebron II, 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir.
2013).
138. See Lebron II, 710 F.3d at 1211.
139. Cf Steven Yaccino, A Faltering Approach to Denying Public Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 2013, at A10 (recognizing that some states are beginning to search for nuanced
ways to drug test welfare recipients without relying on suspicionless drug testing).
140. See Lebron II, 710 F.3d at 1218 (Jordan, J., concurring) ("We are not making any
definitive legal pronouncements about the ultimate constitutionality of Fla. Stat.
§ 414.0652. We are reviewing the grant of a preliminary injunction on an undeveloped
record, and therefore are considering only the district court's determination that Mr.
Lebron is likely to succeed on the merits of his Fourth Amendment claim." (citations
omitted)).
141. See id. at 1206 (majority opinion).
142. See Press Release, Governor Rick Scott of Fla., Governor Scott: We Will Appeal
Welfare Drug Testing to Supreme Court (Feb. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Scott Press Release],
available at http://www.flgov.com/2013/02/26/governor-scott-we-will-appeal-welfare-drug-
testing-to-supreme-court/ ("The court's ruling today is disturbing. Welfare is 100 percent
about helping children. Welfare is taxpayer money to help people looking for jobs who
have children. Drug use by anyone with children looking for a job is totally destructive.
This is fundamentally about protecting the wellbeing of Florida families. We will protect
children and families in our state, and this decision will be appealed to the Supreme
Court."); cf Robert Rector, Welfare Program Should Promote Self-Sufficiency, U.S. NEWS
(Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-welfare-recipients-be-tested-
for-drugs/welfare-programs-should-promote-self-sufficiency (extolling the virtues of
programs such as the Florida drug testing requirement).
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whether a special need justifies suspicionless drug testing. 14 3
Comparing the opinions from the district and appellate courts in the
Michigan litigation and the arguments from either side in the Florida
litigation indicates where the uncertainty lies within the current
special needs analysis. The following subsections lay out where these
parties have disagreed. The first subsection exposes the discord over
what constitutes a special need, and the second subsection exposes
the discord over when and why a group of people has a diminished
expectation of privacy.
1. Do the Goals of the Government's Program Constitute a Special
Need?
One major area of confusion in special needs jurisprudence
involves how the government proves the existence of a special need in
order to justify a suspicionless search. The arguments in favor of
suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients can be grouped into
several themes, such as ensuring the fiscal health of the state;'"
protecting the health of those on welfare, particularly, the health of
those individuals' children;145 and moving individuals out of
dependency.'" The Sixth Circuit in Marchwinski II accepted all of
these arguments, 147 but the federal courts in the Lebron litigation
143. Compare 2011 Fla. Laws 81, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.0652 (West
2013)) (enacting suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients), with Lebron 1, 820 F.
Supp. 2d 1273, 1292-93 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (enjoining the law as a preliminary matter after
finding that Florida had not demonstrated a special need that would justify suspicionless
drug testing), aff'd, Lebron II, 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013).
144. See Kimberly Yee, Opinion, Opposing View: No Drug Test, No Welfare, USA
TODAY (Mar. 18, 2012, 7:23 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.comlnews/opinion/story
/2012-03-18/drug-tests-welfare-Yee/53620412/1 (presenting an argument by Arizona
legislator Kimberly Yee that drug testing makes fiscal sense).
145. See Horace Cooper, Drug Testing of Welfare Recipients Is Sound, Sensible and
Constitutional, NAT'L POL'Y ANALYSIS (Nov. 2011), http://www.nationalcenter.org
/NPA627.html (arguing that drug testing is in the best interests of Florida's children).
146. See Budd, supra note 93, at 775-76 (presenting short excepts from the
Congressional Record where members of Congress spoke about the problem of drug use
among those receiving government benefits); Robert Wilonsky, Perry, Dewhurst Want to
Drug Test Texans Collecting Welfare and Unemployment Benefits, DALL. MORNING NEWS
(Nov. 13, 2012, 1:16 PM), http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2012/11/perry-dewhurst-
want-to-drug-test-texans-collecting-welfare-and-unemployment-benefits.html (reporting
Texas Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst's belief that it is "beneficial to welfare recipients
for us to reform and strengthen our job training requirements and require them to be
drug-free so that we can help them get back on their feet and back to work").
147. See Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d 330, 333-37 (6th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted,
judgment vacated, Marchwinski III, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir.) (en banc), rev'd by an equally
divided court, Marchwinski IV, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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flatly rejected them.'" These divergent results indicate that lower
courts have little guidance to determine if the government's
objectives are "special needs" within the Supreme Court's definition,
and legislators will continue to believe that they have the authority to
conduct suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients.
First, courts are divided on whether the government must put
forth a real public safety concern in order for its objective to
constitute a special need. After Chandler, there has been considerable
disagreement on whether a safety concern is necessary or is just one
factor in calculating whether a special need exists.'49 In Marchwinski
II, the Sixth Circuit held that safety was not required; it was just one
of several factors that the court could consider.s0 In contrast, the
courts in Lebron I and Marchwinski I ruled that the special need must
concern public safety, even over the objections of the States that they
did not have to establish a public safety need."' If safety is the only
reason for using the special needs exception, legislators' arguments
that they can conduct suspicionless searches of welfare recipients
would be tenuous because there are no pressing safety concerns in
that context.152 But if safety is only one of several factors that can
justify suspicionless drug tests, supporters of suspicionless searches of
welfare recipients feel they have compelling justifications to support
such forms of testing.
Moreover, the evidentiary standard employed by the courts in
Marchwinski II and in the Lebron litigation appears to be different.
In Lebron I and Marchwinski II, the States put forward nearly
identical justifications for drug testing: overcoming dependence,
protecting children, ensuring that public money is not used to
148. See Lebron I, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd, Lebron II, 710
F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013); Lebron II, 710 F.3d at 1211-14.
149. See Bulthuis, supra note 74, at 1556. Different panels of the Fifth Circuit also
considered this question within the same term. See United Teachers of New Orleans v.
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 142 F.3d 853, 856-57 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that preventing
injuries at work among school teachers did not justify suspicionless drug testing because
there was not a sufficient nexus between workplace injuries and impairment); Aubrey v.
Sch. Bd. of Lafayette Parish, 148 F.3d 559, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1998) (implicitly distinguishing
United Teachers of New Orleans and finding that a suspicionless drug test of a custodian
was justified because of the dangerous chemicals and machinery that the custodian used
and the threat to students it posed).
150. See Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d at 334-35.
151. See Lebron 1, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1287-88; Marchwinski 1, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134,
1139-41 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd, Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh'g en
banc granted, judgment vacated, Marchwinski III, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir.) (en banc), aff'd
by an equally divided court, Marchwinski IV, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
152. See Lebron 1, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1287-90; Marchwinski 1, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
153. See Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d at 335-36.
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purchase drugs, and limiting the public health risk posed by crimes
associated with the illicit drug use and trafficking.'54 The court in
Marchwinski II readily accepted these goals as special needs "beyond
the normal need for law enforcement."' 5 In doing so, the court
accepted the government's objective without much scrutiny as long as
the government's interest qualified as a special non-law enforcement
need."' Evaluating the same objectives, the Lebron I court required
that the government present evidence that the testing responded to a
"concrete danger" and would "actually redress the problem that gave
rise to the special need."' This evidentiary standard appears to be a
much higher burden than that required in Marchwinski II, and the
government was unable to meet that high burden in Lebron I."
Following along with the question of the correct standard of
review, courts have struggled to define the appropriate amount and
source of data that can prove there is a drug use problem substantial
enough to justify suspicionless drug testing. The Lebron I court's
skepticism of the government's claims stemmed from the fact that
Florida conducted a demonstration project in 2001 and did not find
many drug users among those who receive government benefits."'
However, the Lebron I court went further, dismissing other studies
the State put forth that suggested a nationwide drug problem.6 o The
Lebron I court found that all of this data was irrelevant, pointing out
the age of the data along with the differences in demography and
154. Lebron 1, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1286; Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d at 335-36.
155. Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d at 335-36 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Cf The Supreme Court, 1996 Term - Leading Cases: Suspicionless Drug Testing,
111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 298-99 (1997) (arguing that the balancing test provides little
resistance to the government's alleged special need).
157. Lebron I, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1289; see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-19
(1997) (recognizing the necessity of a concrete danger before removing individualized
suspicion).
158. See Lebron I, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1288-90.
159. See id. at 1286-88; see also id. at 1276-77 (explaining the results of the Florida
Demonstration Project); Robert E. Crew, Jr. & Belinda Creel Davis, Assessing the Effects
of Substance Abuse Among Applicants for TANF Benefits: The Outcome of a
Demonstration Project in Florida, 17 J. HEALTH & SOC. POL'Y, no. 1, 2003, at 39, 39-48
(same). During the demonstration project, 5.1% of the screened welfare recipients tested
positive for drug use, which is less than the 8.13% of the general population that uses
drugs. See Lebron I, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1277; see also Budd, supra note 93, at 776
(recognizing that the correlation between poverty and drug addiction is "quite weak" but
that the empirical data regarding drug abuse has not been a major factor in the debates on
the issue). Whether it was based on this finding or not, the Florida legislature decided not
to implement drug testing for all welfare recipients. See Lebron 1, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
160. See Lebron I, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1286-87.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
geography between the study's population and the group subject to
tests under the Florida law.161
While the Lebron I court criticized the data put forward by the
State as irrelevant for identifying the drug problem in Florida, the
Supreme Court in Earls accepted the government's use of nationwide
data to prove that there was a drug problem among one school
district's high school students.'6 2 The Court found that this nationwide
data, combined with a few anecdotes of possible drug use among the
school district's students, 6 made it reasonable for the school district
to enact a system of suspicionless drug tests.'" With some cases
requiring specific data to justify a system of drug tests and others
finding nationwide data and local anecdotes sufficient, courts are left
to struggle with a number of questions regarding what empirical data
can be used to justify broad suspicionless searches, such as: (1) Should
the court accept national data or must it be local? (2) How recent
must data be to be relevant? (3) Can state officials extrapolate the
severity of the drug problem in their area based on national statistics
or dated research?
Complicating matters further, the Supreme Court in Earls went
on to assert that evidence of a demonstrated drug problem was
helpful but not necessary in all cases for establishing a special need.'65
The Earls Court noted that evidence of a demonstrated drug problem
would merely "shore up" the government's asserted special need for
stopping drug use.'" Armed with evidence of a nationwide drug
problem, the Earls Court allowed the school district to test all
students involved in extracurricular activities without any proof that
161. See id.
162. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002)
("Indeed, the nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in
every school.").
163. See id. at 834-35 ("Additionally, the School District in this case has presented
specific evidence of drug use at Tecumseh schools. Teachers testified that they had seen
students who appeared to be under the influence of drugs and that they had heard
students speaking openly about using drugs. A drug dog found marijuana cigarettes near
the school parking lot. Police officers once found drugs or drug paraphernalia in a car
driven by a Future Farmers of America member. And the school board president reported
that people in the community were calling the board to discuss the 'drug situation.'
(citations omitted)).
164. See id. at 834-36.
165. See id. at 835 ("We have recognized, however, that '[a] demonstrated problem of
drug abuse ... [is] not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing regime .... '"
(alterations in original) (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997))).
166. See id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997)).
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there was a drug problem among the specific group of students.16 7 The
Court cited Chandler for the proposition that evidence of a drug
problem was helpful but not necessary." Yet, in the sentences
following the proposition cited by the Earls Court, the Chandler
Court invalidated a set of suspicionless drug tests because the
government did not establish a drug-use problem among those who
were to be tested.169 The Chandler Court found that there was no
special need present to justify Georgia's suspicionless drug testing of
elected officials because, in part, the State did not assert any evidence
of a drug problem among the State's elected officials.170 Based on the
conflicting nature of these cases, lower courts are left to struggle with
whether or not the State must provide evidence of an actual drug
problem among those it aims to test.
In addition to arguments over appropriate sources of supportive
data and whether such data is necessary, part of the disconnect
between those who support and those who oppose suspicionless drug
testing could stem from deeply engrained assumptions about poverty
and drug use. Many legislators assume that preventing drug use
among the poor is a critical government objective despite data
showing very little correlation between drug use and receiving
welfare benefits.171 Professor Jordan Budd lays out three premises
that seem to undergird the desire to submit welfare recipients to
suspicionless drug tests: (1) the poor are addicted to drugs, which
prevents them from escaping poverty; (2) the State can-and some
would say should-exert dominion over the lives of welfare
recipients; and (3) the efficacy of drug testing programs in reducing
drug use is irrelevant. 7 2 These assumptions lead legislators and other
advocates to believe a special need is present. 173 However, legislators
167. See id. ("The School District has provided sufficient evidence to shore up the need
for its drug testing program.").
168. See id. (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997)).
169. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 320-22 (1997).
170. Id. at 321-22.
171. See Budd, supra note 93, at 775-78 (describing the weak links between drug abuse
and poverty). For example, Professor Budd noted data from a National Alcohol
Epidemiologic Survey that found that "the rate of drug abuse and/or dependence among
welfare recipients ranged between 1.3 and 3.6 percent in comparison to a rate of 1.5
percent across the broader population." Id. at 776-77.
172. See id. at 775-81.
173. Cf Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, "Special Needs" in Criminal
Justice: An Evolving Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant and Probable Cause
Requirements, 3 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 203, 220-23 (1993) ("[D]anger looms that the
Court, serving an ideological agenda and using the convenience of a balancing test, may
effectively negate decades of Fourth Amendment precedent and case law by carving out a
few broad exceptions that can be misinterpreted and misapplied by lower courts.").
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have been unable to prove that these assumptions are supported by
empirical data.174 The disconnect between what legislators believe and
what they can prove leads to greater confusion as to why some courts
accept the State's goal of limiting drug use as a special need and some
do not.
2. How Do Courts Determine Whether a Group of Individuals Has a
Diminished Expectation of Privacy?
Along with the question of what constitutes a special need, lower
courts have also been split on the factors that prove that a group has a
diminished expectation of privacy. An individual's interest in privacy
is one of the factors that courts balance to determine whether the
special needs exception excuses individualized suspicion. 7s With
conflicting ideas of who has a diminished expectation of privacy,
lower courts cannot consistently apply the special needs test. As
explained above, the Supreme Court has identified several groups
that have a diminished expectation of privacy, including government
employees, probationers, and high school students."' As courts have
considered whether welfare recipients have a diminished expectation
of privacy, proponents of suspicionless drug testing of welfare
recipients have attempted to analogize welfare recipients to these
other groups.
For instance, the court in Marchwinski II analogized welfare
recipients to the railroad employees in Skinner and found that, like
the railroad industry, "welfare assistance is a very heavily regulated
area of public life with a correspondingly diminished expectation of
privacy.""' Similarly, the State of Florida argued that, just like the
parental role it plays when children are in school, the state
174. See, e.g., Lebron 1, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1287-88 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (rejecting the
Florida legislature's evidence in support of its alleged special needs), aff'd, Lebron II, 710
F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013).
175. See supra Part I.C.
176. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
177. See Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d 330, 337 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1988); Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 379 (6th Cir. 1998)), reh'g en banc granted, judgment vacated,
Marchwinski III, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir.) (en banc), rev'd by an equally divided court,
Marchwinski IV, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also To Receive Welfare,
Should Drug Test Be Required?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law-jan-junel2-drugtesting_03-20/ ("It's no different as
far as an invasion of privacy as it is in the private sector or in government as a condition of
employment. We have to do drug tests for that. I don't see any difference in having to do




government steps into the parental role when it provides welfare
benefits to children."' Florida argued that it should be allowed to
subject welfare recipients to suspicionless drug testing based on this in
loco parentis argument"'-the same reason the government used to
justify testing students in Acton and Earls.'s While the courts rejected
this argument in the Lebron litigation,'"' proponents of suspicionless
drug testing believe there are obvious connections. 8 2 The courts may
keep rejecting these arguments, but the assumption that welfare
recipients have a special relationship with the government, similar to
public employees, permits proponents of suspicionless drug testing to
argue that welfare recipients have a diminished expectation of
privacy.
Although federal courts enjoined the Florida law and the Sixth
Circuit eventually reinstated the injunction against the Michigan
law,8 3 uncertainty surrounding the special needs doctrine will remain
unresolved until the Supreme Court steps in. The Court could
provide a more certain basis for deciding special needs cases by
clarifying the judicial role in allowing suspicionless drug testing of
welfare recipients. The Lebron courts found it helpful to ask whether
individualized suspicion was impracticable before diving into the
178. See Lebron 1, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1289.
179. See id.
180. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 840 (2002)
(Breyer, J., concurring); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-56 (1995).
181. See Lebron II, 710 F.3d 1202, 1213 n.9 (11th Cir. 2013) ("State officials are not in
the same position vis a vis either the adult or child participants in the TANF program and
thus, the child welfare-related special need identified in Earls and [Acton] is inapplicable
here.").
182. See, e.g., Scott Press Release, supra note 142 ("Welfare is 100 percent about
helping children. Welfare is taxpayer money to help people looking for jobs who have
children. Drug use by anyone with children looking for a job is totally destructive. [The
Florida system of suspicionless drug tests] is fundamentally about protecting the wellbeing
of Florida families. We will protect children and families in our state . . . ."); David Vitter,
Government Programs Should Not Encourage Lifelong Dependency, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 15,
2011), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-welfare-recipients-be-tested-for-
drugs/government-programs-should-not-encourage-lifelong-dependency (setting out the
views of David Vitter, a current U.S. Senator and Louisiana gubernatorial candidate).
Throughout the Supreme Court's own discussion of the special needs exception, similar
paternalistic themes emerged. For instance, the Court analogized how a warrant
requirement would interfere with a parent's discipline of a child as it justified suspicionless
searches of probationers' homes. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987).
Moreover, it reiterated that, like parents, probation officers have the probationer's best
interest in mind. Id. However, arguments that the government can simply step into a
parental role should be treated with extreme wariness, as they could potentially justify a
host of government intrusions into citizens' everyday lives.
183. See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
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balancing of public and private interests.'" The Supreme Court could
take Lebron's lead on the impracticability test to avoid arbitrary
application of the special needs doctrine by lower courts. In doing so,
the Court would prevent future controversies over the application of
the special needs doctrine.
While not a complete fix to the problem, subjecting the
impracticability component of the Court's existing test to more
heightened scrutiny could lead to a more consistent and efficient
special needs analysis. The following Section explores the arguments
for and against a more robust impracticability standard and
demonstrates how the impracticability standard may be used to more
definitively respond to calls for suspicionless drug tests of welfare
recipients.
III. CLARIFYING THE SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION BY
EMPHASIZING IMPRACTICABILITY
In response to the inconsistency with which the special needs
doctrine has been applied, a number of scholars have called for
reform. Some have argued for a complete overhaul or outright
abandonment of the special needs exception.""5 Others have pushed
for reinforcing or possibly reimagining various elements within the
current test for the special needs exception.186 In line with the latter
group of scholars, this Comment argues that merely emphasizing the
fundamental question of whether a search based on individualized
suspicion would be impracticable under the circumstances could
create a more constructive and predictable analysis that would
remove some of the inconsistency in the debate over drug testing
welfare recipients.
Impracticability should serve as a threshold question in the
special needs analysis-that is, courts should first consider whether
individualized suspicion is impracticable in a situation before
balancing the government and private interests at stake. If the
184. See Lebron I, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1291-92 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (rejecting the
Florida legislature's evidence in support of its alleged special needs), affd, Lebron II, 710
F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013).
185. See, e.g., Robert S. Logan, Note, The Reverse Equal Protection Analysis: A New
Methodology for "Special Needs" Cases, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 447, 467-98 (2000)
(arguing for a "reverse equal protection analysis" that would subject all searches to
intermediate scrutiny unless the search was part of a class of searches that was subjected to
only rational basis review due to the class's diminished expectation of privacy).
186. See, e.g., Harrold, supra note 8, at 339 ("If the 'special needs' doctrine is to
continue to exist, the Court should continue the trend in [Edmond] and Ferguson and
reign the doctrine back to its original 'root' application.").
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government can accomplish its objective using individualized
suspicion, a court should strike down any effort to search individuals
without a warrant or individualized suspicion." The following
subsections explain why an analysis that begins with heightened
scrutiny of whether suspicion-based searches are impracticable-
before balancing individual and government interests-will lead to a
more consistent application. This impracticability analysis can be
applied efficiently in new situations and will be more in line with the
development of the special needs exception.
A. How the Impracticability Test Would Work as a Threshold
Question
In the Supreme Court's special needs cases, it identified instances
when individualized suspicion is impracticable . 8  Thus, a court
encountering a program of suspicionless searches would question if
these circumstances-compiled by Justice O'Connor in her Acton
dissent-exist:
(1) The circumstances are too chaotic to obtain individualized
suspicion; 9
(2) The level of scrutiny that is required of this kind of person,
either because of their safety-security job responsibilities, is not
187. The district court in Lebron I made a similar argument as it enjoined the Florida
law. See Lebron 1, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. The court explained part of the rationale for its
holding by noting,
The State has made no showing that it would be 'impracticable' to meet these
prerequisites [a showing of reasonable suspicion or probable cause] in the context
of TANF recipients. Any suggestion that it would be impracticable should be
based on some evidentiary showing, and any such showing would likely be belied
by the fact that other states competently administer TANF funds without drug
tests or with suspicion-based drug testing and no other state employs blanket
suspicionless drug testing.
Id.; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 678 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for abandoning an impracticability standard); Dubbs v.
Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that there was no
inherent impracticability in complying with ordinary Fourth Amendment norms before
conducting physical examination of Head Start students without parental consent or
notice).
188. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 674-76 (citing Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Execs.' Labor Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 631 (1989); Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 n.40 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 557 (1976); Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967); United States v.
Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974)).
189. See Skinner v. Ry. Execs.' Labor Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 631 (1989) (asserting that
the scene following a serious train accident would make it impossible to test for drug use).
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possible (i.e., it is impossible to monitor the person as closely as
that person should be monitored);19 0
(3) The violation has no observable characteristics;19 '
(4) The observation necessary to develop individualized
suspicion would violate the confidentiality that is part of the
government program;192
(5) There is not enough time for the government to develop
individualized suspicion;19 3
(6) There is no way to develop individualized suspicion
reliably;'9 4 or
(7) One undetected instance of wrongdoing could harm a great
number of people.9 5
If these criteria are present, the court can conclude that
individualized suspicion is impracticable and move on to consider
whether the government has a special need that outweighs the
individual's interest in privacy.196 However, if these or similar
conditions are absent, the court would find that the government's
searches cannot proceed without individualized suspicion.'9 7 The
190. See Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989) (finding
that customs officials could be searched without individualized suspicion due to the
dangerous nature of drug interdiction).
191. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (finding it
impracticable to rely on individualized suspicion of housing code violations before
authorizing inspections).
192. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 n.40 (1979) (recognizing that the
government must search visitors before a prison visit because observing prisoners during a
prison visit would create an "obvious disruption of the confidentiality and intimacy that
these visits are intended to afford").
193. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (recognizing that
"the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car
that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens.").
194. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002)
(arguing that individualized suspicion would place too much of a burden on the
educational professionals and put them in an adversarial relationship with the student).
195. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989) (recognizing
the "disastrous consequences" of even one train wreck caused by a drug- or alcohol-
impaired operator); Camara, 387 U.S. at 535 (identifying the threat of "fires and epidemics
[that] ravage large urban areas").
196. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 678 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he individualized suspicion requirement has a legal pedigree as old as the
Fourth Amendment itself, and it may not be easily cast aside in the name of policy
concerns. It may only be forsaken, our cases in the personal search context have
established, if a suspicion-based regime would likely be ineffectual."); Dubbs v. Head
Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003) ("The premise of the 'special needs'
doctrine is that these are cases in which compliance with ordinary Fourth Amendment
requirements would be 'impracticable. ").
197. See, e.g., Harrold, supra note 8, at 339-40 (recognizing that impracticability is the
sine qua non of the special needs analysis).
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Supreme Court in Chandler recognized this distinction, as it sought to
distinguish the constitutional drug testing of customs officials in Von
Raab and Georgia's unconstitutional drug testing of candidates for
designated state offices."' The Chandler Court noted that the customs
officials in Von Raab were involved in a dangerous profession and
were not subject to day-to-day scrutiny, 9 9 one of the circumstances
justifying suspicionless searches listed in O'Connor's Acton dissent.2 00
In contrast, the relentless scrutiny given elected officials meant that
individualized suspicion was possible, and as a result, the
suspicionless drug testing of elected officials was unconstitutional.2 0'
Although the Chandler Court did not specify that impracticability was
a threshold question that it considered, Chandler demonstrates how
the impracticability question may help courts distinguish between
cases where suspicionless drug testing is justified and schemes where
it is not justified.
If a court were to apply this threshold question to the system of
suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients, the court would find
that the factors listed in O'Connor's Acton dissent show that relying
on individualized suspicions is not impracticable in these
circumstances.202 Specifically, the process of applying for welfare
benefits does not happen in chaotic circumstances; drug use has
observable characteristics; asking questions and pulling criminal
records are similar to the requirements that welfare recipients already
face; and one person's drug use would not create a major public
safety problem. Therefore, a court could confidently conclude that
individualized suspicion in these circumstances is not impracticable.203
In addition, the court could look at whether other jurisdictions
found that individualized suspicion either is or is not impracticable. A
number of jurisdictions already require individualized suspicion
before subjecting an individual to drug tests.2 0 These jurisdictions
198. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997).
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 188, 190 and accompanying text.
201. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321.
202. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 674-76 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (collecting cases that identified when individualized suspicion was
impracticable); supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text (listing the factors).
203. See Lebron I, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd, Lebron II, 710
F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013).
204. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-294(3) (2005 & Supp. 2011) (requiring that each
adult recipient be screened and tested if "the department has reasonable cause to believe
[the recipient] engages in the illegal use of controlled substances"); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 208.027 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 230.52 (West 2004 &
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establish reasonable suspicion using various mechanisms.205 For
instance, Arizona relies on a screening questionnaire to develop
reasonable suspicion of drug use before it subjects an individual to a
drug test.206 Until recently, North Carolina subjected a participant in
its Work First Program to random drug testing only if a doctor or an
individual with a specific certification diagnosed the participant as an
addict. 207 These states found that they could accomplish the purposes
of their welfare system without resorting to suspicionless drug testing.
Of course, the federalist system means that the experiences and
judgments of one state do not apply to other states. Still, states have
found ways to accomplish their goals without abandoning
individualized suspicion.208 If the government wants to enact
suspicionless drug testing, it should bear the burden of proving that
individualized suspicion is impracticable, 209 and laws from other states
that base drug tests of welfare recipients on individualized suspicion
Supp. 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-3-1202 (2012 & Supp. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 35A-3-304.5 (LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2012).
205. For example, while not a jurisdiction, the Department of Commerce suggests a
reasonable suspicion standard and gives several criteria that may raise individualized
suspicion of drug use by an employee. Those criteria include (1) "observable phenomena,
such as direct observation of drug [use] or possession and/or the physical symptoms of
being under the influence of a drug"; (2) "a pattern of abnormal conduct or erratic
behavior"; and (3) an "[airrest or conviction for a drug-related offense, or the
identification of an employee as the focus of a criminal investigation into illegal drug
possession, use, or [distribution]." See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DRUG-FREE
WORKPLACE PLAN 25 (2009), available at http://hr.commerce.gov/s/groups/public/
@doc/@cfoasa/@ohrm/documents/content/prodOl008040.pdf.
206. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-294(3). An Arizona newspaper reported,
All adult recipients must now fill out a new three-question statement on illegal-
drug use to apply or reapply for DES benefits. If answers on that statement
provide 'reasonable cause' of illegal-substance abuse, the department will notify
the adult that they must complete a drug test within 10 days, at the state's expense.
Amy B. Wang, Welfare Recipients Face Drug Tests, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Nov. 25, 2009 12:00
AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/11/25/20091125urinetestingll25.html.
207. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-29.1(a) (2011), amended by 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws
417, § 4.
208. Cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences
to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
209. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989);
Skinner v. Ry. Execs.' Labor Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976).
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militate against a finding that individualized suspicion is
impracticable.210
The factors laid out in Justice O'Connor's Acton dissent, along
with the experience of using individualized suspicion in other states,2 1 1
indicate that it is not impracticable to require individualized suspicion
in the context of drug testing welfare recipients. As such, the special
needs inquiry would end there, and the court would not have to
balance the public and private interests. Thus, states cannot test
welfare recipients without individualized suspicion.212
B. More Consistent and Efficient Application of the Special Needs
Exception
Although balancing tests allow judges to weigh the interests of
opposing parties, they can be inefficient when addressing new and
complicated legal issues and can lead to inconsistent outcomes that
210. See Lebron I, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2011) ("What the Fourth
Amendment requires is that such incursions by the Government must be reserved for
demonstrated special needs of government or be based on some showing of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. The State has made no showing that it would be
'impracticable' to meet these prerequisites in the context of TANF recipients. Any
suggestion that it would be impracticable should be based on some evidentiary showing,
and any such showing would likely be belied by the fact that other states competently
administer TANF funds without drug tests or with suspicion-based drug testing and no
other state employs blanket suspicionless drug testing."), affd, Lebron II, 710 F.3d 1202
(11th Cir. 2013).
211. The Tennessee legislation is an interesting case study of a state recognizing the
constitutional limitations of suspicionless drug testing of all welfare recipients. An initial
version of the bill included suspicionless searches similar to laws in Georgia and Florida:
"The department must require that the results of a recent urine drug test be submitted by
each individual who applies for TANF." Bill Summary of 2012 Tenn. S.B. 2580, TENN.
GEN. ASSEMB., http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/billinfo/BillSummaryArchive.aspx
?BillNumber=SB2580&ga=107 (last visited Feb. 19, 2014). However, the Tennessee
Attorney General warned that the bill would be unconstitutional if the testing it
authorized did not require individualized suspicion. See Limitations on Drug Testing as a
Condition of Receiving Public Assistance, Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 12-41 (Mar. 20,
2012), available at http://www.tn.gov/attorneygenerallop/2012/opl2.41.pdf. Thus, the
approved version of the bill required an initial screening and some form of reasonable
suspicion before the applicant can be tested for drugs. See 2012 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1079,
§§ 2(9), 3.
212. As an aside, states would be better served by adopting the two-step process rather
than suspicionless drug testing. The two-step process is based on individualized suspicion
gained in a nonintrusive manner, thus leaving fewer grounds for constitutional challenge
for these programs. The process is also more cost-effective and will continue to deter drug
dependency because those who are dependent will be more likely to be caught. More
importantly, dependency is more likely than occasional drug use to keep individuals from
returning to work.
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bewilder those outside of the judiciary. 213 The current focus on
balancing requires that the court consider whether there is a safety
interest at stake in each drug-testing scheme and determine whether
214
the group subject to testing has a diminished expectation of privacy.
If a person subject to suspicionless drug testing wants to challenge the
testing, the court must engage in a highly factual determination of the
group's expectation of privacy and a policy-driven debate on whether
the government interest is sufficiently important.215
This analysis is inefficient and leads to inconsistent results. As
shown in the cases above, parties have disagreed over whether the
threat of illegal drugs is considered a special need.2 16 Opposing parties
offer statistics, anecdotes, and societal trends to justify their
conclusions on how substantial the drug problem is in the United
States and whether the drug problem justifies suspicionless drug
tests.2 1 Similarly, when courts look at the data on drug use, judges
have come to different conclusions on both the magnitude of the drug
problem among welfare recipients and how much must be done to
combat this problem. Those who support suspicionless drug testing
may claim that opponents of these programs are not fully aware of
the drug problem in the United States, particularly among those who
receive government benefits. At the same time, those who would
require individualized suspicion harbor varying assumptions about
welfare recipients or about the amount of drug use among recipients
of government benefits. Whatever the reasons for this disconnect
between the parties, the courts are not in the position to resolve this
policy debate.
The current focus on balancing the public and private interests in
the special needs analysis gives each group hope that it will be able to
prove that the problem they see-whether the problem is drug use
among welfare recipients or the invaded privacy of those same
individuals-is substantial enough to require judicial action. With
those on either side of the debate focusing on opposing issues, it is not
surprising that these systems of drug testing have led to protracted
litigation with ambiguous judicial responses and a clear disconnect
between the parties who oppose and parties who support
suspicionless drug testing.
213. See Cooper, supra note 145 (arguing that the judiciary is not "[keeping] pace with
the times" and drug testing is not unreasonable for welfare recipients in Florida).
214. See supra Part I.C.
215. See Samay, supra note 57, at 305-06.
216. See supra Part II.
217. See supra Part II.B.1.
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Setting impracticability as a threshold question allows the court
to avoid revisiting this policy debate with each new claim. Instead of
weighing the public and private interests or weighing in on
controversial social issues, the court would first question whether
individualized suspicion is impracticable under the circumstances.21 8
This initial consideration would in many cases prevent the court from
considering the special needs of each situation and entering a
contentious policy debate if it is clear that the government could
accomplish its purpose using individualized suspicion.
Those skeptical of a more robust impracticability test might
argue that it adds another step to an already complicated analysis,
creating a more inefficient process rather than making it more
efficient. However, it will be easier for courts to lay down guidelines
as to when individualized suspicion is impracticable 2 19 than it has been
to establish guidelines concerning when the special need outweighs
the individual interest in privacy. 220 As seen above, the Supreme
Court can easily spell out criteria that a lower court can identify,221
rather than leaving a lower court to attempt to analogize the Court's
divergent opinions on suspicionless drug testing.
Additionally, courts perform a similar "gatekeeping" function in
other areas of the law. In administrative law, courts first determine
whether due process applies before moving into a balancing of the
public and private interests at stake in the administrative
determination. 222 The question of whether due process exists-much
218. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 678 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
219. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text (listing the examples given in
Justice O'Connor's Acton dissent of when the Court has found it impracticable -to rely on
individualized suspicion).
220. Scholars have recognized that the formulation of whether the special need is
substantial has been highly indeterminable. See, e.g., Budd, supra note 93, at 793; Tracey
Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under the Fourth
Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
165, 170 (2006) (labeling the Supreme Court's reasoning as "not logically consistent" and
"ad hoc" and the lower court rulings as "contradictory"); W. J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains,
Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 554 (1992)
("[L]ittle or no effort has been made to explain what these 'special needs' are; the term
turns out to be no more than a label that indicates when a lax standard will apply.").
221. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
222. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) ("The Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits any state deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Application of this prohibition requires the familiar two-stage analysis: We must first ask
whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of 'life, liberty or property'; if protected interests are implicated,
we then must decide what procedures constitute 'due process of law.' " (citations
omitted)).
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like the question of whether individualized suspicion is
impracticable-is a constitutional question, not a policy question.223
Courts are better suited for answering these constitutional questions
than they are at answering questions of policy.
Those who support the current special needs analysis argue that
impracticability cannot be considered in a vacuum because weighing
the public and private interests at stake necessarily requires
consideration of impracticability. 24 Based on this argument,
opponents may claim that the push for efficiency sacrifices a more
complex and fact-specific application of the special needs doctrine for
an arbitrary bright line. However, the desire for balancing public and
private interests mistakes the real question at the heart of the special
needs analysis: whether the government is justified in dispensing with
the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.225 Thus, the line drawn by the Court is not arbitrary-it
is a critical element of the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, some may claim that the determination of whether
individualized suspicion is impracticable will be as controversial and
highly fact-based as the decision over whether drug tests serve a
special need where public interest outweighs private interests. Just as
in the debate over whether the public interest outweighs the private,
courts will have to consider all of the circumstances surrounding
implementation of the plan. Nonetheless, the impracticability analysis
does not question a need's importance; it questions whether relying
on individualized suspicion is possible under the circumstances. This
question is a much different inquiry and one that does not require the
court to weigh in on whether drug use is an imperative national crisis.
To realign the special needs doctrine with this fundamental
question, a threshold test must be "substantial enough that only those
cases that truly justify departure from the individualized suspicion
requirement would advance to the balancing stage."226 Questioning
223. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . ); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
224. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995); see also Lebron
II, 710 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2013) ("The question is not whether drug use is
detrimental to the goals of the TANF program, which it might be. Instead, the only
pertinent inquiry is whether there is a substantial special need for mandatory,
suspicionless drug testing of TANF recipients. . . .").
225. See The Supreme Court, 1996 Term - Leading Cases: Suspicionless Drug Testing,




whether individualized suspicion is impracticable is a substantial test
that will focus the special needs analysis. Even if this threshold
question sacrifices some of the fact-specific analysis of the balancing
test, looking for impracticability before balancing will ensure that the
test is applied more efficiently because courts will only move to
balancing once this more substantial threshold has been met.227
C. Protecting Legislators' Evaluations of Government Objectives
from Judicial Second-Guessing
As well as being inconsistent and inefficient, the current focus on
balancing second-guesses legislative determinations on the necessity
of a government objective. Under the current special needs analysis,
courts are left in the precarious position of telling legislators that the
problem they see-drug use among welfare recipients-is not actually
a problem. By second-guessing the extent of this problem, the current
special needs test is inconsistent with the judicial role.228 This judicial
second-guessing has led some legislators and commentators to believe
that the judge either made the wrong decision or that more
information would convince the judge that suspicionless searching is
correct.229 This belief may explain why legislators continue to push for
such legislation in spite of judicial action halting these programs.
In contrast, setting impracticability as a threshold constitutional
question more clearly communicates that the judiciary, when it
declares a set of suspicionless searches unreasonable, chose to do so
because of the constitutional requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, not because the judge is enforcing his or her own social
beliefs over the beliefs of elected legislators. The threshold
impracticability standard does not question the importance of the
government objective. Instead, it focuses on whether the search can
be conducted with individualized suspicion or whether that would be
impracticable. This new analysis may not have changed some of the
227. See id. at 299 ("[C]learly articulating the threshold test's requirements ... would
help lower courts understand that the initial inquiry is a substantial hurdle meant to weed
out the vast majority of cases.").
228. See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 432 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[T]he majority, whose Members often pride themselves on their reluctance to play an
'activist' judicial role by infringing upon legislative prerogatives, does not hesitate today to
dismantle Congress' extension of federal habeas to state prisoners.")
229. See Cooper, supra note 145 ("As a precedent, Judge Scriven's ruling [in Lebron I]
is off the mark and epitomizes judicial micromanagement of American domestic social
policy. It is a temporary win for the ACLU and a setback for Florida taxpayers. Drug
testing of welfare recipients is sound and sensible public policy-and far from being an
unreasonable or unconstitutional invasion of privacy.").
2014] 985
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
special needs decisions handed down by the Supreme Court,23 0 but it
would help state legislatures and other civic groups understand why a
court supported or invalidated the state's program of suspicionless
drug testing. Understanding where the lines are drawn may prevent
legislators from continuing to push for unreasonable invasions of
privacy.
That said, others may claim that making the determination of
impracticability is just another form of the judiciary second-guessing
the legislature. No matter the rationale, the legislature will not be
pleased when a court enjoins its program. However, the decision on
impracticability does not involve a judicial determination on what is
an important social problem. Instead, it merely calls on the legislature
to consider whether the constitutional requirements have been met.
A threshold impracticability test protects the individualized suspicion
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and it sets clear boundaries
that the legislature cannot cross instead of telling legislators that the
social problem it fears is not important enough.
CONCLUSION
The recent calls for drug testing of welfare recipients
demonstrate that some legislators believe that the problem of drug
use among those who receive government benefits is a special need
and that the special need doctrine justifies subjecting recipients to
suspicionless drug testing. Courts applying the special needs
exception have had trouble convincing state legislators that this is
incorrect. The current special needs test, with its focus on balancing,
indicates that individualized suspicion can be avoided in any
circumstance as long as the government can show it has a strong
interest. This litigation inappropriately devolves into a policy debate
on the need for drug testing. As such, the special needs analysis leaves
only problems of inefficiency and inconsistency and very few
definitive answers.
More heightened scrutiny on the question of impracticability
would create an analysis that ensures that individualized suspicion is
only set aside when it is impracticable. Tying success in the special
needs exception to a determination of whether individualized
suspicion is impracticable aligns more closely with what the Supreme
Court envisioned when it created this exception to the Fourth
230. See Bulthuis, supra note 74, at 1575-76 (recognizing that the drug test in Von
Raab may be upheld if the government proved that the imminence of danger in the field
when one is under the influence of drugs could justify suspicionless testing).
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Amendment. More importantly, this revamped special needs analysis
will ensure that legislators will know when they must require
individualized suspicion and when it is excused, and courts will be
better able to dispose of government programs that too eagerly do
away with the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
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